Blog

  • Diplomatic shifts in the warming Arctic

    Diplomatic shifts in the warming Arctic

    Issue:Competition over resources

     

    The summer of 2010 saw the third-lowest amount and extent of Arctic sea ice ever recorded. For the third year in a row both the Northwest Passage between Greenland and Alaska and the Northern Sea Route between Norway and Kamchatka were ice-free – something that had not happened before 2008 in recorded history. As the physical state of the High North is changing, so too is the diplomatic environment.

     

    The changing North

    On 19 September 2010, sea ice covered 4.6 million km2 of the 14.1m km2 Arctic Ocean. This was 2.1m km2, or 31%, below the average summer minimum during the last two decades of the twentieth century. It was the third-lowest extent, after 2007 and 2008, since consistent records began. Eight of the ten lowest minimums have been experienced in the last ten years. Change is also visible in winter ice cover: the maximum extent in March 2010 was 4% below the 1979–2000 average of 15.8m km2, an area greater than the Arctic Ocean itself, since many areas outside the Arctic also freeze. The extent of ice cover is not the only story. The total volume of ice is also showing a downward trend, in both summer and winter. This is because the proportion of multi-year to newly formed ice is also declining. Since older ice tends to be thicker, this changing proportion means the total amount of summer ice in the Arctic is declining faster than the area it covers.

     

    Some observers have taken comfort in the fact that ice extent increased year-on-year in both 2008 and 2009, with 2010 levels still above those of 2007 and 2008. But this was in part because the record low of 4.1m km2 in 2007 was an anomaly, falling well below the long-term trend. Other observers worried that the 2007 melt was a harbinger of disaster – that a tipping point had been passed and that accelerating warming might lead to a seasonally ice-free Arctic in as little as ten years. But the figures for 2010 closely reflect the long-term trend. Both the optimists and the pessimists appear to have been wrong.

     

    However, this long-term trend is worse – in the context of global climate change – than projected even five years ago. Only the most extreme of the projections included in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2007 Assessment Report showed an ice-free Arctic by the end of the twenty-first century. Yet the trend with regard to actual observations falls outside the range projected by the IPCC models (see chart). A simple linear extrapolation of the current trend would imply some seasonally ice-free years in the Arctic by the 2040s, while an accelerating trend that better fits the data suggests a date of 2030. Recent model-based projections that take into account the latest data give dates ranging from around 2040 to 2080, with most expert opinion inclining towards the earlier end of the range.

     

    The full article can be found at IISS

     

    Image source: IISS

     

     

    Comments

    Post new comment


  • report

    report

    Beyond dependence and Legacy: Sustainable Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

    Chris Abbott and Thomas Phipps | Oxford Research Group | June 2009

    Issues:Competition over resources, Marginalisation

    Tag:report

    Sub-Saharan Africa is too readily dismissed from the outside, but the regional perception is often one of optimism. It is an area rich in natural resources: ranging from oil and natural gas to other minerals such as chrome, nickel and zinc. Nearly half the population are under the age of 14, making the region free from the demographic burden of an ageing workforce prevalent in other parts of the world. Read more »

    From Within and Without: Sustainable Security in the Middle East and North Africa

    Chris Abbott and Sophie Marsden | Oxford Research Group | March 2009

    Issues:Climate change, Competition over resources, Global militarisation, Marginalisation

    Tag:report

    The Middle East and North Africa is a region of great diversity. It encompasses Arab and many other ethnic populations, theocratic and secular states, democracies and authoritarian regimes. A region of immense wealth and crippling poverty; it is blessed (some might say cursed) with vast resources, not least oil, but has not always proved able to manage them for the benefit of ordinary people. Read more »

    Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century

    Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda | Oxford Research Group | June 2006

    Issues:Climate change, Competition over resources, Global militarisation, Marginalisation

    Tag:report

    This major report was the result of an 18-month long research project examining the various threats to global security, and sustainable responses to those threats. Read more »

    An Uncertain Future: Law Enforcement, National Security and Climate Change

    Chris Abbott | Oxford Research Group | January 2008

    Issue:Climate change

    Tag:report

    Climate change will have serious environmental, socio-economic and security consequences for both developed and developing nations alike. This report explores these consequences and demonstrates that they will present new challenges to governments trying to maintain domestic stability. Read more »

    Tigers and Dragons: Sustainable Security in Asia and Australasia

    Chris Abbott and Sophie Marsden | Oxford Research Group | November 2008

    Issues:Climate change, Global militarisation

    Tag:report

    Asia is a region in transition, and transition creates uncertainty. The political, economic and societal landscape is shifting, with major new powers emerging and smaller states attempting to protect their interests in this changing dynamic. At the same time, climate change and the other long-term emerging threats to security will require regional responses and thus a degree of regional unity. Read more »

  • Sustainable Security

  • Sustainable Security

     

    National Guard smallMax G. Manwaring, a Professor of Military Strategy in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College has written an interesting piece on what he calls the “new security reality in which business-as-usual approaches are of little use.

    Manwaring focuses particularly on the changing nature of threats posed by non-state actors (insurgents, transnational criminal organizations, terrorists, private armies, state proxies etc.) who are able to exploit trends and circumstances such as poverty, social exclusion, environmental degradation, and political economic-social expectations for violent ends. He argues that from a US military point of view, “the enemy has now become a state or nonstate political actor that plans and implements the long-term multidimensional kinds of indirect and direct, nonmilitary and military, nonlethal and lethal, and internal and external activities that threaten a given society’s general well-being and exploits the root causes of internal and external instability.”

    Such a change in the global security environment must surely result in changes in our risk analysis and threat assessments. In a piece for the International Relations and Security Network, Myriam Dunn Cavelty writes that “In order to identify risks, elaborate scenario-based approaches combining expert-knowledge from various fields are used. The aim of these undertakings is to develop a concrete basis for political action by ranking the identified risks by their estimated probability and severity: the more likely and the more damaging, the more urgent the response.” Yet while many governments around the world have begun to place a greater emphasis on understanding the factors that drive conflict (rather than just the instances in which conflicts are expressed in forms of violence around the world), not enough is being done to bridge the gap between threat analysis and policy response. It is one thing to accurately identify new drivers of insecurity, but quite another to find ways of mitigating them through preventive public policies. Central to this must be a greater emphasis on prevention in civil service training and recruitment programmes across a number of areas.

    For example, a report by the Center for American Progress released last year noted that “While there have been a number of well-received conflict prevention trainings by and for U.S. government officials, they are too few in number and insufficiently available to all interested foreign affairs officials.”

    Of course, for militaries, the changed threat environment that Manwaring and others are pointing to means not only a need for new training but also for a cultural shift in the way they think about the utility of their traditional tool – the use of force. For Manwaring, “…power has changed. It is no longer combat firepower. Power is multidimensional, and more often than not, is nonkinetic (soft). It is directed at the causes as well as perpetrators of violence.”

    Addressing the causes of insecurity requires what groups such as Saferworld and others refer to as ‘upstream conflict prevention.’ This can easily become a catch-phrase used by governments and NGOs with little effect on actual policies, a point picked up on by Saferworld in their excellent new briefing on what upstream prevention actually looks like in practice.

    Thinking through the consequences of the changing nature of global security, both in terms of threat assessments and policy responses to those threats (military and non-military), will certainly require new approaches at the broad conceptual level. The fact that this is being touched upon by think tanks, NGOs and even army war colleges is surely a good sign – is sustainable security an idea whose time has come?

    Ben Zala is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester.

    Image source: Utah National Guard.

  • Sustainable Security

    The fate of Colombia’s Legión del Afecto as a government-financed peacebuilding program is uncertain, but it looks to endure as an independent social movement. Its persistence is due both to its historical development and to its emphasis on affective relationships.

    Authors Note:  This material is based upon work supported by the United States National Science Foundation under Grant #1452541. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

    The Legión del Afecto – translated as the Legion of Affection – is a Colombian social network broadly mobilized around peace. It is arguably the most overlooked, yet broadest-based network, for peace in Colombia. Unlike other more-publicized movement networks like the Congreso de los Pueblos or the Marcha Patriotica, the Legión del Afecto was established as intentionally non-polarized with respect to the left/right politics that have long generated conflict in the country and across Latin America.

    Instead, the politics of the Legión del Afecto might best be described as a politics of sentir – a politics of feeling. “Ver, oir, sentir” (to see, to hear, to feel) is one of a few familiar phrases of the Legión del Afecto, which has been echoed in all corners of the country.

    The politics of “feeling”

    Image credit: Legión del Afecto.

    While recognizing and valuing social difference – especially across lines of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation – the Legión del Afecto has emphasized the bodily capacity to sense and feel as a point of social and political convergence for the country’s youth in the face of seemingly insoluble conflicts at multiple scales; the fact that each individual feels differently (because of distinct biographies, identities, and physical experiences) should not matter as long as a politics could be build around respecting and valuing others’ bodily capacity for feeling.

    In essence, this respect and valuing of the other is what “affection” has come to mean in the network. As a result, non-verbal means of communicating feelings have become highly valued in the Legión del Afecto. So-called ‘alternative languages’ of dance, music, theatre, clowning, acrobatics, fire-blowing and more, along with shared banquets, journeys, festivals and other shared sensorial events have been central to continued mobilization and motivation of legionarios (Legion participants), often youth between the ages of 15 and 25.

    In a country where many have been killed for simply appearing to favor one side or the other, the focus on feeling rather than on political side-taking has been crucial to the survival and thriving of both the network and the leaders within it. Because of this intentional and conspicuous lack of side-taking, the Legión del Afecto has been able to enter and intervene in location and communities across the country where others – e.g., police, military, government – were once unable to go. Of course, it would not be accurate to portray legionarios as lacking political views or direction; the opposite is true. However, as a network the Legión del Afecto has focused on creating space for dialogue and political learning rather than defining or persuading one single way of analyzing current national and global trends.

    These spaces of learning and dialogue have been particularly important as the network grew to include ex-combatants from all sides of the Colombian conflict. Intentionally setting down the conflicts associated with polarized national politics meant that the Legión del Afecto could mobilize ex-guerilla, ex-paramilitary, ex-soldiers, ex-gang members as well as many others affected by violence and by the pervasive lack of opportunity for marginalized youth.  These participants enriched the Legión del Afecto through sharing their differences in lived experience, rather than swallowing or forgetting their pasts.

    Origins and Evolution of the Legión

    The Legión del Afecto began in 2003 (under another name) as a collaboration between different ‘base’ (i.e. grassroots) groups in the city of Medellín, which had many prior years of experience in peaceful social transformation at the community level. In particular, two groups – Casa Mía, a group focused on urban youth, and La Colonia de San Luis, a group serving once-rural families who experienced violent displacement – united their expertise in the formation of the Legión del Afecto. Casa Mía was especially important as many of the Legión del Afecto’s founding antecedents – for example, the focus on afecto or affection – came from its founding leaders’ own collaborative legacy of radically innovative and daring peacebuilding in the Santander neighborhood of Medellín. The earlier peacebuilding of Casa Mia involved building trust and affection among young men pertaining to dueling gangs as well as standing up for justice and non-violence in the face of direct threats from paramilitary groups.  That such strategies were effective in the face of conflict is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that the Legión del Afecto, after first being funded by the UNDP (for methodological development), was scooped up as a government-sponsored program, housed under Acción Social (under president Uribe), and then the Departamento para la Prosperidad Social (DPS) (under Santos).

    As a government program, the Legión del Afecto grew a centralized administration, and new rules and regulations to follow, but it was never “just” a government program. As the Legión del Afecto spread from it’s origins in the city of Medellín to over 40 other cities, towns, and rural municipalities across the country, the network tapped into and drew from existing base community groups in each location. In each place, new leaders were nurtured alongside already-established community leaders who grew and gained new ideas. Existing effective ties were used to strengthen the network and bring in new participants. And in each place, the particularities and challenges of the location brought new strategies for peacebuilding that were focused on the traditions, as well as the problems, of each region: for example, a focus on traditional music (gaitas) in San Jacinto, or a focus on memory and ritual in many rural places where violent acts had occurred.

    The Legión Today

    It is often stated that there are currently “over 2000” young legionarios across the country, but the actual effect of the Legión del Afecto is much larger. behind any official count of participants, there are thousands of families and tens of thousands of friends and community members who have been affected by the peacebuilding efforts of the network. These friends, families, and community members are the ones who came to grand events – like the Carnival del Pan (2009, Cali), or Hip Hop Sin Fronteras (2010, Medellin), which mobilized massive numbers of participants. And these friends, families and community members are also the individuals who know and trust the participants in the Legión del Afecto through their small daily actions, and who therefore have been willing to work together with them in their efforts to build an ‘everyday’ peace in communities across the country.

    Today, this expanded and enduring capacity of the network is more important than ever; despite recent funding uncertainty for the Legión del Afecto as a government program, the Legión del Afecto persists as a grassroots network – a potentially powerful, motivated, and emotionally interconnected movement of young and old, who hold some very significant lessons for the development of a truly post-conflict society.

    Further Information on the Legión

    More information about the Legión del Afecto, its history, activities, and methodologies, is being made available through the grassroots website still-in-progress: www.legiondelafecto.org.

    The Legión del Afecto network is present in the following cities and regions in Colombia: La Macarena, Playa Rica (la Y), San Juan de Lozada, San Vicente del Cagüan, La Catalina, Montañita, Puerto y Florencia, Medellín, San Luis, San Fransísco y Sonsón, Samaná Florencia y Pensilvania, Soacha, Bogotá y Viota, Barrancabemerbeja, San Pablo y Puerto Wilches, Chiquinquirá y San Miguel de Sema,  Cartago, San José del Palmar, Bojayá, Quibdó, Buchadó, Pamplona, Cúcuta, Tibú, La Gabarra, Cali, Buenaventura, Armenia, La Tebaida, Manizales, Cartagena, Montes de María, Magangué y Plato, Puerto Tejada, y Villavicencio, Copey, San Juan del Cesar y Villanueva Guajira, Chibolo, Carepa, Turbo, Acandí, Ungía y Carmen del Darién y Mistrató, Tumaco, Líbano y Natagaima, Ovejas, Santa Rosa del Sur y Simití, Puerto López, El Retorno , San José del Guaviare y Mocoa.

    Allison Hayes-Conroy is an assistant professor of Geography and Urban Studies at Temple University. She has studied the Legion del Afecto as a peacebuilding initiative alongside the other two authors – both participants in the Legión – since 2011. Hayes-Conroy’s has published widely on role of the body in social movements and initiatives. Her work on peace-based social initiatives in Colombia and her work on bio-social pedagogical innovation have both been funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation.

     Cesar Buitrago Arias, is a community leader and law student. He has worked for 20 years to support the needs of displaced families like his own, who come to the city of Medellin, Colombia from rural areas due to violence.

     Alexis Saenz Montoya, is a Ph.D. Student in the Department of Geography and Urban Studies at Temple University. His research interests lie in the intersection of community-based organizations and popular education in Latin America.

  • Sustainable Security

    National Security, Climate Change and the Philippine Typhoon

    Super Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines on 8 November, and is possibly the most powerful tropical cyclone on record. Beyond the immediate impact of the typhoon, the natural disaster is already proving to be a threat to national security, with reports surfacing of massive looting and military engagement following attacks on government relief convoys. As US and UK naval convoys head to support the situation, Andrew Holland discusses climate change’s impact as a threat multiplier and what plans militaries and governments must make to prevent the insecurity that will come with future disasters of this scale.

    Read Article →

    Bay of Bengal: a hotspot for climate insecurity

    The Bay of Bengal is uniquely vulnerable to a changing climate because of a combination of rising sea levels, changing weather patterns, and uncertain transboundary river flows. These problems combine with already existing social problems like religious strife, poverty, political uncertainty, high population density, and rapid urbanization to create a very dangerous cocktail of already security threats. Andrew Holland argues that foresight about its impacts can help the region’s leaders work together to solve a problem that knows no boundaries.

    Read Article →

  • Disclaimer

    Disclaimer

    This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorised by the copyright owner. SustainableSecurity.org is a non-profit site and is making such material available for educational and research purposes in order to advance understanding of the threats to global security and sustainable responses to those threats. Oxford Research Group believes this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material.

  • Finding the Right Paddle: Navigating Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies

    Finding the Right Paddle: Navigating Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies

    The New Security Beat | The New Security Beat | June 2011

    Issue:Climate change

     After decades on the periphery, climate change has made its way onto the national security stage. Yet, while the worlds of science, policy, and defense are awakening to the threats of rising sea levels, stronger storms, and record temperatures, debate continues over the means and extent of adaptation and mitigation programs. In a world of possibilities, how to decide which paddle to use to navigate uncertain waters?

    A report from E3G titled, Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security, contends that a more rigorous risk management approach is needed to deal with the security implications of climate change, and cues should be taken from the risk management approach of the national security community. Risk management, while not a “panacea” for divisive climate change politics, “provides a way to frame these debates around a careful consideration of all the available information.”

    The report calls for a three-tier, “ABC” framework for international planning:

    1) Aim to stay below 2°C (3.6°F) of warming
    2) Build and budget assuming 3-4°C (5.4-7.2°F) of warming
    3) Contingency plan for 5-7°C (9-12.6°F) of warming

    Authors Nick Mabey, Jay Gulledge, Bernard Finel, and Katherine Silverthorne write, “Absolutes are a rarity in national security and decisions are generally a matter of managing and balancing various forms of risk.” Climate change adaptation and mitigation, they say, is no different. “There are multiple levels of uncertainty involved in addressing and planning for climate change…such as how much global temperatures will rise, what the impact of more rapid regional climate change will be, and how effective countries will be in agreeing to and implementing adaptation and emissions reduction plans?”

    The security community “need[s] to go out and tell leaders that they will not be able to guarantee security in a world where we don’t control climate change, and that controlling climate change means radical changes – not just more incremental progress,” argued Mabey, the Founding Director and Chief Executive of E3G, in a video interview with ECSP in May 2009.

    Preparing for the effects of climate change is certainly a daunting task given the complexity and scope of the system – the entire planet. It is therefore important to gather as much information as possible and to “look in the dark spaces” of our knowledge gap. 

    But, “uncertainty per se cannot be a barrier to action,” write Mabey et al. “Uncertainty doesn’t mean we know nothing, just that we do not know precisely what the future may hold. Risk management is both an art and a science. It depends on using the best data possible, but also being aware of what we do not know and cannot know.”

    Article source: The New Security Beat

    Image source: Pondspider

    Comments

    Post new comment


  • Global militarisation

    Global militarisation

    The current priority of the dominant security actors is maintaining international security through the vigorous use of military force combined with the development of both nuclear and conventional weapons systems. Post-Cold War nuclear developments involve the modernisation and proliferation of nuclear systems, with an increasing risk of limited nuclear-weapons use in warfare – breaking a threshold that has held for sixty years and seriously undermining multilateral attempts at disarmament. These dangerous trends will be exacerbated by developments in national missile defence, chemical and biological weapons and a race towards the weaponisation of space.

    Articles EXCLUSIVELY written for sustainablesecurity.org

    Issues:Climate change, Competition over resources, Global militarisation, Marginalisation

    To browse a list of all of the articles EXCLUSIVELY written for sustainablesecurity.org – follow this link

    Read more »

    “Mali: Another Long War?” – Sustainable security on channel 4 news

    Ben Zala and Anna Alissa Hitzemann | | January 2013

    Issue:Global militarisation

    French soldierNot unlike the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the French government has begun the intervention with talk of short timelines and minimal troops on the ground before quickly changing its tune, write Anna Alissa Hitzemann and Ben Zala for Channel 4 News .

    Image source: Channel 4 News (from original article)

    Read more »

    “Mali: Why Western Intervention is destined to fail” – Sustainable security on Channel 4 News

    Issue:Global militarisation

    Britain is on standby and the US is already transporting French troops into Mali. But the west is “betting on the wrong horse” by intervening in the region. Now well over a decade after the beginning of the so-called war on terror, yet again, another western nation is leading a military intervention against Islamist paramilitaries based in a largely ungoverned region of a state in the Global South, write Anna Alissa Hitzemann and Ben Zala for Channel 4 News.

    Image source: Defence Images

    Read more »

    Myanmar: Peaceful Transition to Democracy or Storm Clouds on the Horizon?

    Anna Alissa Hitzemann | | November 2012

    Issues:Global militarisation, Marginalisation

    Published last week, Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon is International Crisis Group’s latest Asia report. It focuses on the potential for political violence and social instability as Mynamar’s leaders are undertaking reforms “to move the country decisively away from its authoritarian past”.  

    Image source: Rusty Steward

    Read more »

    A top-down approach to sustainable security: The Arms Trade Treaty

    Zoë Pelter | | November 2012

    Issue:Global militarisation

    Will an Arms Trade Treaty work towards sustainable security? As the future of the world’s first global treaty on the arms trade is discussed by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, this article explores how the potential treaty – if reopened for further negotiation – could assist sustainable security policy.

    Image source : Oxfam

    Read more »

    Towards sustainable civilian security in South Sudan

    Zoë Pelter | | October 2012

    Issue:Global militarisation

    Civilian disarmament campaigns in South Sudan currently attempt to tackle one of the many symptoms of the country’s militarised post-war society. Instead, these campaigns must be seen as one part of an overarching and sustainable disarmament and security sector reform strategy that must be undertaken long term, while ensuring that the immediate security of communities is safeguarded and that their need for weapons to protect themselves is adequately addressed and reduced.  In South Sudan, there is a need for proactive strategy – not reactive operations – towards sustainable civilian security.

     Image Source: ENOUGH Project

    Read more »

  • “Mali: Another Long War?” – Sustainable security on channel 4 news

    “Mali: Another Long War?” – Sustainable security on channel 4 news

    Ben Zala and Anna Alissa Hitzemann | | January 2013

    Issue:Global militarisation

    (This piece was originally published by Channel 4 News on Tuesday 22 January 2013, and is the second of two parts)

    French soldierThere is a stark warning today the western intervention strategy in Mali is “flawed”. Part two of a special paper also says France and others are likely to be involved in the conflict “for some time”. 

    Not unlike the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the French government has begun the intervention with talk of short timelines and minimal troops on the ground before quickly changing its tune, write Anna Alissa Hitzemann and Ben Zala for the Oxford Research Group. 

    The initial deployment of 800 French troops may end up numbering more than 2,500 and President François Hollande has stated France’s mission is to ensure that “when we end our intervention, Mali is safe, has legitimate authorities, an electoral process and there are no more terrorists threatening its territory”. This does not seem to tally with the earlier statement by the French Foreign Minister that the current level of French involvement in the country would last for “a matter of weeks”. 

    The latest reports are that the Islamist fighters have been preparing for this intervention by carving a network of caves and tunnels into cliff faces to house bases and supplies of fuel and ammunition. This, combined with the concerns about the roles of both the Malian security forces and a number of potential contributors to the ECOWA force in relation to the abuse of civilian populations (and the likely blowback effect of such actions), mean that stability in Mali will be almost impossible achieve with military force alone. 

    It is also far from clear whether the African states that are set to join the intervention will be able commit forces for a drawn-out insurgency. After Chad, the second biggest promised contributor of troops is Nigeria, which has pledged a contingent of 900. 

    Yet the Nigerian government itself is fighting its own Islamist-inspired insurgency with the Boko Haram group in the country’s north. Despite a relative decline in Boko Haram attacks in recent months and even the potential for Saudi-backed peace talks between the rebels and the government, fighting could easily intensify once more, in which case Nigeria is unlikely to remain involved in Mali in any significant way.     

    Without taking serious action to address the sense of marginalisation and disenfranchisement of those who were willing to join one of the rebel groups, there are few reasons to think the current intervention will produce a durable peace in Mali.

    Not only have France and its allies underestimated the difficulty of fighting the northern rebels among civilian populations in which bombing from above is of little use, there appears to be no sign of a plan as to how the factors underlying the uprising (including the original Tuareg rebellion) can be addressed. 

    Without taking serious action to address the sense of marginalisation and disenfranchisement of those who were willing to join one of the rebel groups — Tuareg, Islamist or otherwise — there are few reasons to think the current intervention will produce a durable peace in Mali.

    Ongoing conflict 

    While military force is considered the only option, feelings of resentment amongst elements of the population of northern Mali are likely to increase. Not only this, it will provide ample encouragement to other anti-Western paramilitary groups across North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South and Southeast Asia. 

    The central lesson of the western interventions and small-scale military operations (including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere) of the post 9-11 era, has been that reacting to the symptoms of insecurity once they are deeply manifested, and few options other than military force remain, is a fundamentally flawed strategy for global security. This means that France and others are likely to now be involved in an ongoing conflict in Mali for some time. 

    Not only do the (so far conspicuously absent) plans for a post-conflict stabilisation process need to be settled between France and its coalition partners now, a serious commitment to assisting the Malian government to going much further in addressing the marginalisation of the north will be crucial. 

    Until the focus shifts from military control to working towards solving the root causes of the conflict, no viable sustainable security will be found for Mali. 

    Image source: Channel 4 News (from original article)

    Comments

    Post new comment