Category: Article

Published last week, Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon is International Crisis Group’s latest Asia report. It focuses on the potential for political violence and social instability as Mynamar’s leaders are undertaking reforms “to move the country decisively away from its authoritarian past”. For most of the past 50 years, the government of the Republic of the Union of Mynamar (also referred to as Burma) has been under direct or indirect control by the military. Since independence in 1948, the people of Myanmar have suffered civil wars which have mainly been struggles for ethnic and sub-national autonomy. The country has consistently been in the news for human rights violations. Perhaps one of the world’s most well-known political prisoners, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and opposition politician Aung San Suu Kyi, also chairperson of the National League for Democracy (NLD) was released in 2010 after 21 years under house arrest.

Thein Sein, current president of Myanmar, has put in place a far-reaching and radical reform agenda. The ICG’s report focuses on what reforms have been achieved and what this may mean for a possible resurrection of violence because “political prisoners have been released, blacklists trimmed, freedom of assembly laws implemented, and media censorship abolished. But widespread ethnic violence in Rakhine State, targeting principally the Rohingya Muslim minority, has cast a dark cloud over the reform process and any further rupturing of intercommunal relations could threaten national stability.” With former political prisoners being released, 2,000 high-profile activists and opposition politicians being allowed to return home, and further liberalization of the media, “social tensions are rising as more freedom allows local conflicts to resurface”.

The report notes that “The easing of authoritarian controls has created the space for the population to air grievances, the ability to organise in a way that was not possible before, and the opportunity to have a real influence on government policies and decisions” which has led to an “exponential growth in civil society activity”. In order for the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy to be stable, and for peace and security to be sustainable, the government of Myanmar will have to face and resolve major challenges. Widespread militarization and the political and social marginalization (past and present) of ethnic and religious groups will have to be addressed. For example, it has been estimated that the recent 2012 violence between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists in Rakhine State led to an estimated 90,000 displaced people in addition to dozens of casualties. It will not be sufficient to react to past and present violence by allowing more freedom of speech and liberalizing the press. Trying to contain the violence and reducing state repression alone will not address the underlying drivers of insecurity. The government will have to take a sustainable security approach and make great efforts in order to actively address the causes of long-standing grievances. Addressing only the symptoms cannot lead to long-term stability and the rebuilding of trust between communities.

The ICG offers several options to minimize the risks associated with single party dominance during Myanmar’s political transition. These include changing the electoral system to some form of proportional representation, building coalitions between the NLD and other political parties, and building bridges between the NLD and current president Thein Sein as well as other political forces- particularly the old guard. The ICG recommendations underscore the importance of all parties, and the majority of people, to feel involved in the political process. The marginalization of any political or ethnic/religious groups will most probably lead to further violence and insecurity in the future.

ICG’s full report and details of the policy recommendations can be read here.

Image source: Rusty Steward

Two new films in TalkWorks’ series about nuclear disarmament have been released. In the latest instalments, Baroness Shirley Williams and Sir Jeremy Greenstock give their personal perspectives on the current state of affairs regarding nuclear dangers and progress with the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda.

Baroness Williams is a Liberal Democrat Peer and former advisor to the British Prime Minister on Nuclear Proliferation. She is also a member of the UK Top Level Group and was part of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock is the former British Ambassador to the United Nations and was the UK’s Special Representative for Iraq. He has recently taken over as chair of the United Nations Association of Britian and also joined BASIC’s newly formed independent Trident Commission.

The two films can be viewed here.
 

 

Beirut is immersed in political squabbles while Tel Aviv is building international support on disputed sea borders

Israel is preparing for its fifth war against Lebanon, as it believes that Beirut is not entitled to offshore natural gas deposits, allegedly falling outside non-demarcated maritime borders. This wild assertion is advanced allegedly because the 2007 marine boundary negotiations between Israel and Cyprus on the one hand, and those between Beirut and Nicosia separately, delineated offshore lines.

On July 10, the Israeli government approved an updated demarcation of its territorial waters along the border with Lebanon, and submitted fresh plans to the UN that expanded its naval boundaries by more than 1,500 square kilometres of what were essentially Lebanese waters.

Naturally, this drew the ire of several Lebanese officials, including President Michel Sulaiman, who warned Israel against “unilateral decisions” in the segregation of a shared maritime border. Energy Minister Jibran Bassil asserted that Beirut would not give up its nautical rights though the declaration was typically tangential since no one said that Lebanon was not entitled to its natural resources.

In fact, and legitimate criticisms of Prime Minister Najeeb Mikati’s government notwithstanding, there were no differences between the Hezbollah-dominated cabinet with the Sa’ad Hariri national unity government that was toppled last January. Both prime ministers adopted similar stands in the growing conflict over offshore gas reserves. Rather, the dissimilarity was political because Hariri enjoyed some western support, whereas Hezbollah lacks any.

That is why the dispute was bound to escalate as the Israeli proposed maps lay out sea borders that conflict significantly with those suggested by Lebanon in its own submission to the world body.

Even if Lebanese authorities somehow managed to draw persuasive charts that confirmed Lebanon’s rights in the Special Economic Zone, as announced by Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour, Beirut was faced with a conundrum: how to dissuade Israel?

Self-sufficient

The quarrel is not minor as significant resources are at stake. Both Israel and Lebanon are energy dependant countries that must import oil and gas, which means that the two recent discoveries, the Tamar and Leviathan fields, could allow both to be self-sufficient and even enable them to export surplus production.

The Tamar field, laying approximately 90 kilometres off the coast of northern Israel, was the world’s largest gas find in 2009 while the Leviathan field, 45 kilometres farther out to sea, was said to be the largest deep water natural gas find in a decade. The Tamar field potentially contained 8.4 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, while Leviathan was estimated to contain an additional 16 tcf of natural gas, half of which belonged to Beirut. In fact, because the Leviathan field is located about 130 kilometers northwest of the city of Haifa, at a depth of 1,700 metres, it was largely inside Lebanese territorial waters. This is why Israel decided to redraw the map to get a hold of its contents.

It thus behooves the Mikati government to remain vigilant and rise up to the dual challenges of avoiding a war with Israel while preserving Lebanon’s legitimate national rights. Despite his personal posture, both goals will require outside support, as Beirut must call in friendly chips in this high-stakes game, which are all found in the West.

Mikati and Bassil ought to know that Israel plans to establish a pipeline to Greece, from where it could export gas to Europe, which will further endear it to European governments and, more important, to ordinary people who need heat in cold winters. Needless to say that Lebanon ought to adopt similar ‘friendly’ plans towards Europe and the West.

Instead of considering such plans, Lebanon reportedly begun to explore its own undersea oil resources with Iran, which was bound to add to the country’s volatile conditions. Time will tell whether Mikati will preserve Lebanon or become the instrument of war that will set the country back by another few decades.

For now, and since the only internationally enforced accord between Lebanon and Israel is the so-called Blue Line that was drawn up by the UN after Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon in 2000, a maritime settlement will not be easy to reach. Israel will thus advance the notion that the West and especially Washington ought to side with it and reject any Hezbollah contentions. Few should be surprised if the Obama administration, which is already in election-mode, sides with the Israeli interpretations — despite perfunctory declarations to prevent a flare-up of hostilities.

Today, Lebanon is confronted by an overlapping boundary question, which will require utmost attention if war is to be averted. Mired in interminable political squabbles that will never be resolved, Lebanon is wasting its time while Israel positions itself by fiat, further strengthening its international contacts that will automatically side with it.

Consequently, the time has come for Beirut to hire the world’s top lawyers to argue its case at United Nations fora, for the looming battle is beyond the writ of Oriental machinations that may work in underground bunkers but need to be argued in the open.

Either that or Lebanon should stop everything and prepare for the next war with its nuclear neighbour, a war that it cannot possibly win, and one that it need not contemplate.

 Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.

Article source: Gulf News

Image source: portland general

Q&A, December 2010

Last month, the Heinrich Boell Foundation and WRI convened a group of international experts to discuss policies and incentives for increasing the use of renewable energy in the developing world. WRI’s Davida Wood and Lutz Weischer discuss the key lessons learned at the workshop and their work on helping developing countries make the transition to renewable energy.

What are some of the key renewable energy success stories in developing countries?

Lutz: There are many success stories, as many developing countries have scaled up renewable power in recent years. Of course, China gets a lot of attention, but the trend is much broader than that. The Renewables 2010 Global Status Report counts 45 developing countries with renewable energy targets and 42 with some sort of promotion policy.

One approach that has worked well in many countries is the so-called “feed-in-tariff,” which is a guarantee that renewable energy producers will be able to sell the electricity they generate at a price set in advance by the government. To date, there are 78 countries, states, and provinces that have passed feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy, including a rising number of developing countries. These include major emerging economies such as China and India, as well as smaller countries such as Tanzania and Thailand. In all of them, the feed-in-tariffs have led to more investment in renewable energy generation and an increased share of renewables in the electricity mix.

Davida: In India, electricity regulators at the state level have a mandate to set feed-in tariffs for a range of renewable energy technologies. Some of these state regulators have been very active and have succeeded in attracting considerable investment. For example, in the state of Gujarat, the regulatory commission set a tariff in January 2010 for photovoltaic solar power. Power purchase agreements for 500 megawatts (MW) were signed in just six months, backed up by financial guarantees.

But there are other approaches. In Brazil, after experimenting with various incentive schemes for increasing investments in renewable energy, the National Agency for Electrical Energy held the country’s first wind-only power auction in December 2009. More than 1800 MW of wind power was contracted for.

Lutz: One thing I’d like to add on India is that this has also been a success story for industry development and employment. India’s use of policies to create stable demand for wind power has led to development of a successful manufacturing base, making India the fifth largest wind power market in the world. An Indian company, Suzlon, which began in 1995 with just 25 people, is now the third largest wind turbine manufacturer in the world, employing over 16,000 people globally.

What are the barriers to increased development of renewable energy in the developing world?

Lutz: The number one barrier to renewable energy scale-up in the developing world is cost. Access to modern forms of electricity is crucial for both basic improvements in quality of life and for being able to develop a robust, modern economy. But most people in developing countries simply cannot afford the cost of electricity with increased renewables. They need policies that drive down the costs and increase the deployment of these technologies. Until clean power technologies reach full price parity with fossil fuels, even the best policies will come at an additional cost that can’t be borne by poor ratepayers in developing countries. That’s why international support is needed. For an international donor like the World Bank that’s committed to increasing energy access, you will get more renewable energy if instead of investing in individual wind farms, you invest in the policy environment that makes people want to build wind farms.

Davida: An important element for this approach is access to data and methodologies. While feed-in-tariffs are widely adopted, regulators do not have sufficient access to information about the costs of renewable energy, and are dependent on project developers to provide these figures. At a forum convened by WRI and Prayas Energy Group, a commissioner from the Indian state of Gujarat I mentioned previously described the process by which his state’s tariff had arrived: a combination of technical inputs, public consultations, and artful guesswork. Participants at the renewable energy policy workshop we recently held at WRI also stressed that access to methodologies, benchmarking data and performance metrics, and techniques of competitive bidding are badly needed to support development of renewable energy resources. Independent oversight from civil society is a key ingredient here.

Lutz: That’s right; feed-in-tariffs can be quite successful, but they’re only successful if you’re doing a good job in setting your rates. If you set rates too low, you get no deployment, but if you only rely on information from developers, you end up setting your rate too high and providing windfall profits. Even if there’s good policy in place, developing countries often don’t have the domestic investment capital for these projects. So, you need an international mechanism that mobilizes finance and investment for these projects at affordable interest rates.

Davida: Furthermore, from a planning perspective, much more could be done to design off-grid renewable energy systems–in rural areas for example–that take advantage of the synergies between different forms of renewable energy. For energy on the grid, building capacity on integrated resource planning is key to integrating renewable and conventional energy sources.

Lutz: Yes, that’s true; the challenge of managing a national grid with multiple intermittent sources of energy is greatest in developing countries. You need engineers who are able to install renewable energy technologies, maintain them, and manage the grid.

Finally, some countries simply have not been able to replicate these success stories because they don’t know about them, or don’t know how to implement them in their own countries. So, one priority is facilitating the exchange between countries that have policies and those that don’t.

What is WRI doing to help overcome these barriers?

Lutz: We’re working with the World Bank on reforming their energy strategy, so that in the future, renewables will play a larger role in the Bank’s portfolio. We are also helping to disseminate information on successful policies, for example by convening a renewable energy policy workshop together with the Heinrich Boell Foundation North America. The workshop brought together 20 experts from developing countries that have implemented these policies or are currently considering them.

In the context of the United Nations climate change negotiations, we are advocating for a technology mechanism that will support capacity building and knowledge sharing on regulatory and policy incentives for renewables. We’re also working with negotiators in parallel processes such as the Clean Energy Ministerial and bilateral initiatives. In the coming months, we’ll also be working closely with major emerging economies to develop low-carbon development strategies for their power sector.

Davida: WRI’s Electricity Governance Initiative [EGI] is a joint project of WRI and Prayas Energy Group that works with civil society organizations in developing countries to analyze policy and regulatory decision-making processes. We are increasingly turning our attention to renewable energy. We have convened three forums that have brought regulators and civil society together to share experiences. Prayas has written a seminal paper on attempts to promote clean energy in five Indian states that holds lessons relevant to other countries. And our partners in South Africa and Thailand have used EGI methodology to intervene in national planning processes.

What’s next for this issue? What signs of progress should we look for in the near future?

Lutz: One thing we should look for is an increase in the number of countries that use these policies. There are also international moves in the works. Deutsche Bank has proposed a global feed-in-tariff mechanism. It will be interesting to see how that develops. The revised World Bank energy strategy will come out in 2011, and will hopefully give more weight to renewable energy. We should also look towards the technology mechanism that came out of the climate conference in Cancun, which will create a network of experts and clean technology centers that will help share experiences and build capacity. I’m also optimistic that the Clean Energy Ministerial next year in the United Arab Emirates will produce some more ambitious initiatives on renewable energy.

Davida: There are a lot of promising signs to look for: countries developing a better understanding of best practices in clean energy regulation. These include standardized power purchase agreements; increased transparency of the methodologies used to assess resource capacity, costs, and performance (which will benefit both governments and civil society organizations); harmonization of renewable and conventional energy policy and planning. Most of all, though, the way you’ll know that these policies are working is when you see falling prices and improved reliability for electricity from renewable sources. Ultimately, that’s the real test of these policies.

For further information see: the Heinrich Boell Foundation website.

 

Governments in Asia and the Pacific need to prepare for a large increase in climate-induced migration in the coming years, says a forthcoming report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Typhoons, cyclones, floods and drought are forcing more and more people to migrate. In the past year alone, extreme weather in Malaysia, Pakistan, the People’s Republic of China, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka has caused temporary or longer term dislocation of millions. This process is set to accelerate in coming decades as climate change leads to more extreme weather.  

“No international cooperation mechanism has been set up to manage these migration flows, and protection and assistance schemes remain inadequate, poorly coordinated, and scattered,” the report states. “National governments and the international community must urgently address this issue in a proactive manner.”

ADB expects to issue the report, Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific, in early March as part of a broader ADB project aimed at increasing awareness of, and enhancing regional preparedness for, migration driven by changing weather patterns.

The report highlights specific risks confronting climate change “hotspots”, including megacities in coastal areas of Asia. These hotspots of climate-induced migration face pressure from swelling populations as rural people seek new lives in cities. The problem is compounded by greater dislocation of people caused by flooding and tropical storms.

Climate-induced migration will affect poor and vulnerable people more than others,” said Bart W. Édes, Director of ADB’s Poverty Reduction, Gender, and Social Development Division. “In many places, those least capable of coping with severe weather and environmental degradation will be compelled to move with few assets to an uncertain future. Those who stay in their communities will struggle to maintain livelihoods in risk-prone settings at the mercy of nature’s whims.”

On the positive side, the report says that if properly managed, climate-induced migration could actually facilitate human adaptation, creating new opportunities for dislocated populations in less vulnerable environments.

The ADB project, Policy Options to Support Climate-induced Migration, is the first international initiative that aims to generate policy and financing recommendations to address climate-induced migration in Asia and the Pacific.

To obtain a copy of the draft report, contact  or +63 2 632 6643. For further information visit www.adb.org/SocialDevelopment/climate-migration.

Article source: Asian Development Bank

Image source: Hamed Saber

El Salvador’s gang history dates back to the 1960s. At the time, numerous neighbourhood-based groups provided marginalised urban youths with the means to hang out, party, take drugs, and fight their rivals. These gangs constituted a nuisance for the affected residents but did not represent a public security threat. The situation drastically changed when the Central American civil wars ended and the United States stepped up its deportations of offending non-citizens, including members of Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) and Calle Dieciocho (18^th Street). Both gangs had been formed in Los Angeles’ immigrant barrios, a haven for Central American refugees some of whose children responded to difficult circumstances by joining existing gangs (such as the Dieciocho) or forming their own group (Mara Salvatrucha). Tired of the stresses of gang life, many deportees arrived in their country of origin hoping to make a fresh start. Faced with poor reinsertion opportunities, however, they continued with what they knew best. Their comparatively nice dress, money, and tales of gang exploits held a fascination that local adolescents found hard to resist. Soon the imported gangs absorbed their smaller counterparts and continued to grow, since widespread social exclusion made El Salvador fertile ground for gang proliferation. Over time gang members resorted to greater levels of violence and drug activity, but the country long lacked a full-fledged gang policy.

In 2003 – eight months before the 2004 presidential elections – President Francisco Flores of the conservative ARENA party launched Plan Mano Dura (“Strong Hand”), ostensibly to dismantle the gangs and curb the number of homicides, most of which had been attributed to these groups. Backed by considerable media publicity, the measure entailed not only area sweeps and joint police-military patrols, but was also accompanied by a temporary anti-gang law that permitted the arrest of suspected gang members on the basis of their physical appearance alone. Both the nature and the timing of the initiative suggested that it had been designed to improve the ruling party’s electoral position rather than to ensure effective gang control. Plan Mano Dura enjoyed huge support among a population that had become weary of permanent insecurity, but human rights defenders, judges, and opposition politicians criticised it for its abuses and neglect of prevention and rehabilitation. The measure helped ARENA win the elections, but the incoming administration of Antonio Saca responded to the earlier criticism by incorporating prevention and rehabilitation into his Plan Super Mano Dura. These alternative approaches, however, were a largely rhetorical concession since suppression remained the dominant strategy. Contrary to the official discourse of success, Mano Dura was spectacularly ineffective: the homicide rate escalated, and the gangs adapted to the climate of repression by toughening their entry requirements, adopting a more conventional look, and using heavier weaponry. More importantly, confinement in special prisons allowed gang members to strengthen group cohesion and structure. Moreover, the large-scale incarceration of gang members fuelled the need for more resources for both the inmates and their families and resulted in an upsurge in extortions, particularly in the transport sector.

By June 2009, when the government of ex-journalist Mauricio Funes and the FMLN (the former guerrilla army) came into power, the gang problem had become intractable. MS-13 and Dieciocho clicas (subgroups) sprawled hundreds of marginal urban communities, their members committed a variety of crimes – ranging from threats, robbery, injuries, auto theft, and the illegal carrying of firearms to drug sales, extortions, rapes, kidnappings, and homicides – and their violence had become increasingly diffuse and brutal. The Funes government announced a comprehensive crime policy comprising social prevention, law enforcement, rehabilitation, victim support, and institutional and legal reforms. The strategy, however, is underfunded (state coffers had been plundered by previous administrations), and gangs are being tackled through the overall crime policy rather than a specific gang programme. The police – now under a new command – has stopped conducting mass raids in gang-affected zones and begun to strengthen its investigative capacity. These are promising steps, but events on the ground soon pushed policy in another direction. Public demands for a quick reduction of homicides and media coverage alleging government incompetence led President Funes in November 2009 to deploy the army. Military participation in public security tasks is no recent development. At present, however, the army has been given broader powers, permitting it to conduct patrols, perform searches, and arrest criminals caught red-handed as well as to maintain perimeter security at the prisons. In what appears to be a face-saving gesture, the Funes administration adopted a gang strategy that exhibits ominous parallels with the earlier Mano Dura policies. Meanwhile, prevention and rehabilitation have once again taken the backseat.

Sonja Wolf is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the Universidad Nacional de Mexico, Mexico City where she conducts research on street gangs and organised crime in Central America.

Image source: VCK xD

The importance of distinguishing between nuclear weapon state’s rhetoric- and the reality of what they’ve actually accomplished- has been a recurring theme for disarmament activists at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT), held at the United Nations in New York during May. There are long-standing benchmarks by which we may assess progress towards disarmament and the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. These benchmarks allow us to clearly assess what the UK has brought to the negotiating table- and what it continues to withhold, in defiance of international law, public opinion (the majority of whom wish to see Trident scrapped) and the many states calling for nuclear abolition now.[i]

 

For example, at the NPT conference, civil society activists and several non-nuclear weapon states have repeatedly emphasised that nuclear weapons states are, under Article VI of the NPT, legally obliged to:

 

‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’.[ii]

 

As unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons, this means that NPT members must not only ‘pursue’ negotiations for disarmament- they must achieve that goal.[iii] Thus, by its continued deployment of nuclear weapons, Britain has, for decades, failed to comply with its NPT obligations. Furthermore, by planning to renew the Trident nuclear weapons system and breathe new life into the arms race, the government would not only waste tens of billions of pounds, but defy international law.[iv] The UK is acutely conscious of such perceived failings and has recently tried to fend off growing demands for disarmament by presenting itself as a paragon of nuclear virtue.

 

For example, UK Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament John Duncan’s statement at the NPT cited ‘UK progress towards the “13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI”’.[v] As Rebecca Johnson observed, such recitations (similar in style to those of China, France, Russia and the US) are simply inadequate as they refer to ‘reductions and closures of nuclear facilities undertaken in response to the end of the cold war twenty years ago’.[vi] It is also important to recognise, as Ireland did in an open committee meeting, that ‘reductions in nuclear weapons…do not necessarily equate to a commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons’. Thus, whilst nuclear weapons reductions are welcome, they ‘may be undertaken for a wide variety of reasons’, including ‘financial considerations, safety and security, preventing weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, environmental reasons and so on’.[vii]

 

The UK has also made much of the joint research project it has undertaken with Norway, to verify the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.[viii] Such simulations to achieve best practice are laudable and help prepare the UK for the strong verification and trust-building measures that will be necessitated by a global nuclear weapons abolition treaty. But they remain simulations, whereas the threat to international security posed by Trident- and its replacement- are all too real. Such concerns were reflected by Norway itself, when it argued, on Day 9 of the NPT, that states parties must ‘establish a new international nuclear agenda with an action plan for nuclear disarmament with clear benchmarks and deadlines holding us all accountable’.[ix]

 

The realisation of nuclear weapons state’s commitments under the NPT to disarm and lift the nuclear shadow could indeed be achieved through a legally-binding, verifiable and time-bound treaty which will- irreversibly- abolish nuclear weapons. With this in mind, in addition to strong support from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, the nations supporting a Nuclear Weapons Convention have increasingly made themselves known at the 2010 NPT. They include, in no particular order- and to name but a few- Indonesia, Switzerland, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Austria, New Zealand, Senegal, Iran, Yemen, Egypt, Costa Rica, Lebanon, Colombia and Malaysia. The reason why these countries and civil society groups from around the world back a Nuclear Weapons Convention is because they realise the need to, as Mexican Ambassador Claude Heller puts it, ‘prohibit these weapons with a timeframe that provides certainty to the international community’.[x]

 

Certainty is, indeed, a rare commodity in international affairs. If agreements are to succeed, trust and confidence must be built, in order to construct relationships based on mutual interests and collective security. Multilateral mechanisms such as the treaties outlawing anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, biological weapons and chemical weapons should thus be held up as the truly ‘special’ relationships between states. Such successful examples of states legislating for security in a combined effort to make the world a safer place for all, requires us to ask- why should it not also be possible to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapons ever invented?

 

One answer is that many among the powerful elites who control nuclear arsenals feel threatened by the prospect of having to kick their nuclear weapon addiction. President Obama can say he wants a world free of nuclear weapons, and agree nuclear arms reductions with Russia, but what lessons will Iran, North Korea and other weaker states draw from his recent call for $80 billion to upgrade the US’s nuclear arms complex (described as the largest funding request since the Cold War) and the planned investment, over the next decade, of ‘well over $100 billion in nuclear delivery systems’?[xi] As Paul Rogers has noted, such a ‘fearful embrace of intense security measures’ is undertaken ‘in pursuit of the illusion of control’.[xii] An illusion also because nuclear weapons create insecurity and steal resources from spending on health, education and green energy.

 

The addiction will therefore remain until the nuclear weapons states realise they must relinquish their drive for global power and control. The alternative is stark. If the majority of the 184 non-nuclear weapon states at the NPT, who want the review conference to agree to a legally-binding timeframe for disarmament, do not see sufficient progress, the current window of opportunity for nuclear abolition may not only close, but a new era of nuclear proliferation and terror may be opened.

 

Tim Street is UK Co-ordinator of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

 

For more information:

www.icanw.org.uk

 

Writing for the BBC, Tom de Castella explores the reasons why the fear of a nuclear exchange has receded in the public imagination. Marking the fiftieth anniversary of Robert McNamara’s speech to the American Bar Foundation that outlined the official US position on mutually assured destruction (MAD), de Castella talks to a number of experts about the continuing threat from nuclear stockpiles around the world.

Christopher Laucht from Leeds University reflects on the importance of the fact that under MAD (as opposed to a conventional war), the public had no control. “You were at the mercy of political decision makers. Apart from the fear that one side would do something stupid, there was also the fear of technology and the question of ‘what if an accident happened?’.”

Professor Paul Rogers from the University of Bradford notes that the most serious stand-off today is “the prospect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which tens of millions would die.”

The article notes that “the end of the Cold War hasn’t removed the nuclear warheads. Relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated in recent years. China, whose nuclear programme is little understood in the West, is doubling its military spending. India and Pakistan remains a potential flashpoint. So why don’t people fear nuclear war as they used to?”

The full article with some associated data is available here.

Image source: Leeks.  

National Security Regressives: A New Vocal Constituency Among Conservatives

The ratification of the New START nuclear arms treaty with Russia marked a defeat for an influential faction among America’s right that can best be described as national security regressives. These are “conservative” voices who oppose strengthening and utilizing the full range of traditional tools of American statecraft, including assertive diplomacy, smart and balanced national security spending, and precise and targeted measures to combat terrorist groups. They may have lost on New START, but they are not likely to go away anytime soon.

The fact that a modest arms control measure such as New START took so much time to ratify is a harbinger of tensions to come in 2011—a year in which conservatives face significant challenges reconciling competing national security agendas in their ranks. The starting bell on the Republican presidential primary fight is about to ring, and more foreign policy regressives have joined the ranks of the new Congress—so look for some sharp battles to emerge among conservatives on national security. This internal conservative debate could have a major impact on how America conducts its foreign policy in 2011 and beyond.

Conservatives today are more divided on foreign policy than they have been in decades. The 2010 Republican Party “Pledge” manifesto for the midterm elections, however, papered over these divisions, briefly mentioning national security as an afterthought. It contained few ideas on how to keep America secure and strong.

The debate over the New START treaty exposed some of the conservative divisions on national security. Traditional foreign policy conservatives such as Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) and several former secretaries of state supported the treaty while other national security regressives such as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney, a likely 2012 presidential primary candidate, famously called the treaty “Obama’s worst foreign policy mistake” in this article for The Washington Post. Another key division exists on defense spending. Tea Party advocates, for example, are geared up to fight defense hawks.

The biggest challenge for conservatives in reconciling the divisions on foreign policy in their ranks comes from the regressive camp. National security regressives are usually described as conservatives, but the positions they have staked out on foreign policy make them undeserving of the conservative label.

The dictionary defines conservatives as “disposed to preserve existing conditions and institutions.” What sets regressives apart from traditional conservatives is that they are not interested in preserving existing foreign policy conditions and institutions. In fact, they have eschewed many of the key tools of statecraft that have made America a global leader—assertive diplomacy, smart and balanced national security spending, support for international institutions serving as force multipliers to address some of the world’s most pressing security challenges, and agreements like New START that demand other countries live up to commitments aimed at enhancing global security.

Read the full article here.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is an immediate security challenge to individuals, societies, and states around the world and an enormous hurdle to sustainable security and development. Small arms fuel civil wars, organized criminal violence, and terrorist activities. They also undermine multimillion dollar development programs and other assistance to fragile states. Fragile and failing states should be of particular strategic interest to the United States because even small insurgencies, if unchecked, can erupt into larger civil wars and possibly destabilize entire regions. In some cases fragile and failing states can also become bases for terrorist groups directly hostile to the United States.

In many conflict zones small arms and light weapons are the weapon of choice, the main instrument of death and destruction, and are often used to forcibly displace civilians, impede humanitarian assistance, prevent or delay development projects, and hinder peace-keeping and peace-building efforts. When conflicts end or abate small arms often remain in circulation, which may lead to additional violence and suffering since fighting can resume or conflicts may erupt in neighboring regions. In nonconflict areas small arms may be used in criminal violence or may be used in homicides, suicides, and accidents. And they are frequently the primary tools of terrorists bent on sowing chaos and discord.

The weapons can exact a staggering toll. For example, in January 2010 narco-traffickers armed with assault rifles massacred 16 people—mostly teenagers—attending a birthday party in Ciudad Juarez on the U.S. border. In November 2008 roughly two dozen terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba with AK-47-type assault rifles, 9 mm pistols, and grenades killed nearly 200 people and wounded 350 in Mumbai, India.

Approximately 875 million small arms are in circulation worldwide, and only about a third are in the hands of legally constituted security forces. Because small arms are simple to use, durable, and easy to conceal they are especially prone to misuse, and their misuse directly and indirectly affects hundreds of thousands of people and severely undermines sustainable development in scores of countries around the world.

As we’ll show in this report, the Horn of Africa exemplifies the challenges the proliferation of small arms and light weapons pose for sustainable regional security and development. Somalia is the quintessential failed state that illustrates the cost of small arms and light weapons proliferation and the challenges of recreating the conditions for sustainable development in a heavily armed environment. Despite numerous internationally sponsored peace conferences and billions of dollars in assistance, much of Somalia remains engulfed in civil war and has become a breeding ground for international terrorism.

The insecurity also spreads across borders. In neighboring Kenya (a close ally of the United States), armed violence is common in the pastoralist areas of the northern and northeastern regions of the country. Access to guns has also exacerbated urban crime and political violence in Kenya.

But small arms and light weapons are not only a problem for poor countries. Mexico is an example of how small arms can plague a medium-income country. Small arms are widely used there by organized criminal groups involved in the drug trade and kidnapping. Their use in Mexico has led to large numbers of homicides, undermined local authority, and greatly increased the cost of security for Mexican citizens. The violence is fed by a stream of readily available and powerful weapons from the United States—Mexico’s main source for small arms. At the same time, the U.S. government is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to help the Mexican government combat arms trafficking and criminal violence.

A wide body of international and regional agreements and initiatives has been developed to tackle small arms proliferation, and national small arms policies, programs, and standards vary from country to country. The United States has wide-ranging small arms laws, regulations, and policies, and is often hailed as the “gold standard” for comprehensive policies and practice concerning the transfer, management, and control of small arms and light weapons produced, maintained, and exported within its borders.

But even though the U.S. government has sophisticated laws, regulations, and controls for the legal arms trade, permissive gun ownership laws and lax supervision of certain gun markets have made the United States a significant source of illegally diverted guns, especially in Mexico and other countries in Central America.

The Obama administration has ample opportunities to shape a new and more assertive U.S. position on small arms, but it must navigate the complex domestic political realities of small arms in the United States. A new approach should include greater engagement on small arms issues internationally and stronger domestic efforts to prevent illegal gun trafficking. The United States should actively participate in existing and proposed processes and negotiations and promote meaningful and practical approaches to countering small arms proliferation and misuse.

The administration, Congress, and the public also need to be better educated about the costs and consequences of small arms proliferation and a commitment to develop appropriate U.S. programmatic and policy responses must be cultivated. Raising awareness would counter confusion and misinformation about efforts to address small arms proliferation and misuse and assist real and sustainable progress. Such awareness promotion would include increasing dialogue, through interagency meetings, reports, and statements, on how small arms proliferation and misuse can undermine U.S. security and development goals. This could then encourage policy initiatives and budgetary support for efforts to combat the illegal spread of small arms.

There are four specific steps the United States can take in the short term at the national, regional, and global level to help promote strategic engagement on the small arms issue.

First, at the national level, the United States should increase its assistance for programs that prevent the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Export controls, responsibility, and appropriate vetting of end users are important steps, but it is equally important for the United States to ensure that surplus, obsolete, and potentially destabilizing weapons are removed from circulation. It is these weapons that are most often used in brutal conflicts in countries such as Colombia, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka, and Somalia.

Second, at the regional level, the Senate should ratify the OAS Convention—the 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials, which aims to combat illicit small arms trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. The United States played a key role in drafting the OAS Convention and made sure it was in line with U.S. laws and regulations. But for more than a decade the convention has languished in the Senate. Ratifying it would send an important and powerful message to the Western Hemisphere that the United States is serious about halting illicit arms trafficking, and it would provide another tool to deal with the flow of weapons between the United States and Mexico.

Third, at the global level, the United States should lead the development of a legally binding arms trade treaty that would establish common international standards at the highest level on the export of conventional weapons, including small arms. Under the Obama administration, the United States has already reversed the Bush administration’s position on small arms and demonstrated it is willing to be a constructive partner in developing a treaty and in the U.N. process to control small arms. U.S. laws and regulations comply with or exceed the vast majority of principles that have been proposed in a potential international arms trade treaty, and the United States should ensure its national arms export control system serves as an example for other states.

Finally, the Obama administration should build small arms initiatives into development programs. When the United States undertakes programs on security sector reform and judicial sector reform, particularly in fragile states, the action plan should include steps to address small arms proliferation and misuse. General U.S. support for programs that address weapons demand is critical and requires several key integrated measures, starting with the reform of law enforcement agencies and military forces to ensure they are representative and provide security to all their citizens as well as adhere to international human rights and humanitarian laws.

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