Australia has recently begun to remilitarize in contrast to global trends of cuts in spending. As geopolitics shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the rise of China dominates concerns over the balance of global power, Australian investment in the military – and the navy in particular – shows a change in attitude towards security in the region.  However, as the following article from Foreign Policy in Focus demonstrates, China has not reacted positively to the change in gear in military development nor to Australian intentions to reopen uranium sales to India. Moreover, a 2009 White Paper refers to potential Australian aspirations “…to have greater strategic influence beyond our immediate neighborhood”. While an escalation of regional tensions is not inevitable, cooperation in the western Pacific region may be under threat.

Derek Bolton, 7 December 2011

In the realm of geopolitics, Australia has often been the overlooked continent – a benign haven for rowdy cricket fans and sunburned tourists resting safely under a U.S. security umbrella.

However, recent transformations in the international system, notably the rise of China and an economic slump in the West, are rapidly ushering in a new age in Australian foreign policy. Slowly the sleeping continent has awoken to the din of machinery in uranium mines, shipbuilders in dry docks, and the arrival of a new contingent of U.S. Marines – the latter only the most recent indication of a re-posturing of the country’s foreign policy against perceived Chinese expansionism.

Force 2030

In 2009, Australia’s Ministry of Defense issued a White Paper entitled “Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030,” which outlines an aggressive plan for Australian military expansion. Although economic woes have induced talk of military cutbacks in the United States and much of Western Europe, Australia’s own initiatives have run counter to this trend. “The 2009 White Paper was developed in the midst of a global recession,” notes the document’s preface. “The Government has demonstrated the premium it puts on our national security by not allowing the financial impact of the global recession on its budget to affect its commitment to our Defense needs.” Hinting at an expansionist current, it adds, “The more Australia aspires to have greater strategic influence beyond our immediate neighborhood…the greater level of spending on defense we need to be prepared to undertake.”

The White Paper says that the government will introduce a “comprehensive set of reforms that will fundamentally overhaul the entire Defense enterprise, producing efficiency and creating savings of about 20 billion.” However, reforms should in no way be interpreted as cuts — a sentiment reinforced by the planned expansion of Australian defense capabilities, with a particular emphasis on naval warfare.

Indeed, the document promises “a significant focus on enhancing our maritime capabilities. By the mid-2030s, we will have a heavier and more potent maritime force.” This will include 12 new submarines, three destroyers equipped with SM-6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles, eight new frigates, and Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious ships.

China

Australia has done little to hide the motivations behind this current mobilization. Outlining the rationale behind the formation of the White Paper, the authors write, “Changes in the distribution of global power have become obvious in the past decades. China’s rise in economic, political and military terms has become more evident. Pronounced military modernization in the Asia-Pacific region is having significant implications for our strategic outlook.”

They add, “China is likely to be able to continue to afford its foreshadowed core military modernizations. Over the long term, this could affect the strategic reach and global postures of the major powers. Reflecting on the possibility of U.S. military cutbacks, the report assesses that “Any future that might see a potential contraction of US strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region, with a requirement for its allies and friends to do more in their own regions, would adversely affect Australian interests, regional stability and global security.”

Given Australia’s qualms over Chinese expansion in the region and fear of possible abandonment by the United States, the recent deployment of U.S. forces to the continent should come as little surprise, for it addresses concerns dating back to 2009.

Alliances 2030

Australia has similarly undertaken new initiatives on the diplomatic front with equal fervor. Possibly the most significant move has been Australia’s outreach to India, a longtime regional rival of China. The recent announcement by Prime Minister Julia Gillard that she will reopen uranium sales to India is a prime example, part of the new “trilateral security pact” that has been in the works between Australia, India, and the United States.

Although Chinese diplomats have remained cool toward the security pact, elements within the People’s Liberation Army have voiced their strong opposition to the Australian moves. General Geng voiced grave concern in response to the pact, noting, “This is not in keeping with the tide of the era of peace, development and cooperation and does not help to enhance mutual trust and cooperation between countries in the region, and could ultimately harm the common interests of all concerned.” Geng went on to comment that the notion of U.S. and Australian officials seeking to advance “integrated air and sea combat” amounted to “trumpeting confrontation and sacrificing others’ security for the sake of one’s own security.” Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd has responded in the face of such condemnation, “We are not going to have our national security policy dictated by any other external power. That’s a sovereign matter for Australia.”

So far Sino-Australian exchanges have remained strictly verbal, and not all signs point to confrontation. “Exercise Co-operation Spirit,” a recent joint Chinese-Australian military exercise focused on earthquake disaster response, shows that the two countries have remained generally cordial despite increasing tensions. However, given renewed U.S. initiatives in East Asia in conjunction with Australia’s apparent ambitions to curb Chinese expansion, such joint cooperation may be short-lived.
 

Article Source: Foreign Policy in Focus

Image Source: Australian Defence Force

 After decades on the periphery, climate change has made its way onto the national security stage. Yet, while the worlds of science, policy, and defense are awakening to the threats of rising sea levels, stronger storms, and record temperatures, debate continues over the means and extent of adaptation and mitigation programs. In a world of possibilities, how to decide which paddle to use to navigate uncertain waters?

A report from E3G titled, Degrees of Risk: Defining a Risk Management Framework for Climate Security, contends that a more rigorous risk management approach is needed to deal with the security implications of climate change, and cues should be taken from the risk management approach of the national security community. Risk management, while not a “panacea” for divisive climate change politics, “provides a way to frame these debates around a careful consideration of all the available information.”

The report calls for a three-tier, “ABC” framework for international planning:

1) Aim to stay below 2°C (3.6°F) of warming
2) Build and budget assuming 3-4°C (5.4-7.2°F) of warming
3) Contingency plan for 5-7°C (9-12.6°F) of warming

Authors Nick Mabey, Jay Gulledge, Bernard Finel, and Katherine Silverthorne write, “Absolutes are a rarity in national security and decisions are generally a matter of managing and balancing various forms of risk.” Climate change adaptation and mitigation, they say, is no different. “There are multiple levels of uncertainty involved in addressing and planning for climate change…such as how much global temperatures will rise, what the impact of more rapid regional climate change will be, and how effective countries will be in agreeing to and implementing adaptation and emissions reduction plans?”

The security community “need[s] to go out and tell leaders that they will not be able to guarantee security in a world where we don’t control climate change, and that controlling climate change means radical changes – not just more incremental progress,” argued Mabey, the Founding Director and Chief Executive of E3G, in a video interview with ECSP in May 2009.

Preparing for the effects of climate change is certainly a daunting task given the complexity and scope of the system – the entire planet. It is therefore important to gather as much information as possible and to “look in the dark spaces” of our knowledge gap. 

But, “uncertainty per se cannot be a barrier to action,” write Mabey et al. “Uncertainty doesn’t mean we know nothing, just that we do not know precisely what the future may hold. Risk management is both an art and a science. It depends on using the best data possible, but also being aware of what we do not know and cannot know.”

Article source: The New Security Beat

Image source: Pondspider

Ian Shields writes exclusively for sustainablesecurity.org:

Aviation has come a long way in the century or so since the Wright brothers first flew, and there can be no doubt that it has brought some great benefits: bringing people closer together, allowing (through travel) individuals to experience other places and other cultures, and permitting a greater degree of freedom. The militaries have, after a rather slow start, grasped the opportunities that airpower now represents, and no major military power would seriously consider going to war without airpower and, ideally, mastery of the airspace over their own ground forces. Furthermore, there have been many scientific advances that have benefited mankind in general whose origins were in advances in military aviation, invariably forged in the crucible of war.  Moreover, military airpower can contribute to humanitarian missions as witnessed following the floods in Pakistan, while with more precise weapons fewer civilian casualties are sustained due to aerial bombing: compare present-day Afghanistan with WWII Dresden.

But this article is not an ethical debate about the efficacy of military airpower, it is a look at the impact that military airpower has on the environment now, and what steps need to be taken to minimise that impact. I say “minimise” because there has to be a degree of realism here: Plato said that only the dead have seen the end of war: I will assume that military aviation is here to say and it is impact reduction that we should seek rather than an unrealistic desire to end the military use of the air completely.

The impact of the civil airline industry on the environment is well documented, but what is less well considered is the impact of the military sector. This article will identify three key areas where military aviation has a major impact on the environment, and suggest mitigation policies for each: hydro-carbon use, ground contamination and noise.

Unsurprisingly, by far and away the greatest environmental impact that military aviation has is the use of hydro-carbons.  Military aircraft, for reasons of speed, power and response, utilise rapid-response, high power output engines for their attack and air defence aircraft.  While this gives the necessary performance, environmental considerations are low on the priority list when designing new jet engines, the polar opposite from the civilian airline market where the cost-factor has driven up fuel efficiency.  In America, the United States Air Force accounts for some 1% of the total hydro-carbon use across the country: it is, simply, a gas-guzzler.  It is unlikely that environmental, or even cost, pressures will significantly reduce the carbon footprint while military requirements will continue to demand the immediate thrust response that in turn will require the type of engines presently in use and in development.  However, the military requirement is not unchanging and a spin-off from two particular changes will be a reduction in hydro-carbon use.  The first is increasing use of simulation for flying training on the grounds of cost, efficiency and safety; note that environmental concerns are placed firmly in the second-order effects bracket.  The second, and more subtle change, is the increased use of unmanned or remotely-piloted air vehicles.  This move, on the grounds of greater endurance and lower risk to the operator, has resulted in smaller and lighter vehicles since there is no requirement for the bulky and heavy life-support equipment needed to sustain on-board aircrew.  Furthermore, with no risk to the operating crew, the platforms themselves do not have been as responsive, and engines are generally configured more for endurance than immediate response, resulting in lower hydro-carbon use (1).  For both of these changes, then, while reducing fuel use will be a benefit it will not be an intentional goal: military requirements will continue to predominate and those seeking to reduce the environmental impact of military aviation will need to be mindful of the military imperative.

The other two concerns, though real, have far less environmental impact than hydro-carbon use.  Ground contamination falls into two categories: first, and far from unique to military aviation, is the damage done to the soil at airbases: pollution from leaked aviation fuel, oils and hydraulic fluid used to service the aircraft, de-icing fluid used on aircraft and on runways, all leech into the local water courses and contaminate the environment.  Of course, this happens on civilian airfields too, but at military bases there is the added issue of ammunition and high explosives.  Although Britain’s Royal Air Force has disposed of its stock of nuclear weapons, one wonders what the radiation levels are like at the former storage sites, especially for the early and very crude weapons.  However, there is good news here: as with other airports, environmental standards at today’s military air bases are high and increasing: the loss of Crown Immunity and raising awareness of standards are reducing such pollution markedly.  Furthermore, and praise where praise is due, the UK’s Ministry of Defence has a generally good record for cleaning up sites when they vacate them. Nevertheless, aviation requires the use of some potentially very harmful chemicals and with the rise in use of carbon-fibre (excellent in aircraft as it is strong, light and flexible; really dangerous due to the carcinogenic properties of the material if broken by, say, an accident or hostile fire) new problems are likely to be encountered.  Present legislation goes a long way to minimise this form of environmental damage, but we cannot afford to be complacent.  Second, spent ammunition, as well as the destruction it causes with its initial effect (think the effects of the Dambusters Raid of WW II) there has been marked ground contamination from used ammunition in the past.  Again, this article is not about the ethics of military airpower, but in terms of environmental impact it is good to note that Depleted Uranium is no longer used as ammunition by the RAF.  However, destruction from the air is achieved almost exclusively through kinetic effect, and it is only recently that consideration has been given both to the environmental after-effects of destruction, and to the environmental impact of the chosen weapon system.  These moves are in the right direction, and are to be welcomed, but there remains a long way to go.

My final area of concern is with noise pollution.  While the civilian sector has invested a great deal of money in making jet engines quieter (and, of course, more fuel efficient to reduce operating costs) the same cannot be said for the engines in jet fighters and attack aircraft.  The military requirements from their engines are, as intimated earlier, different from a civilian airliner, with the need for immense thrust at any moment (achieved by the use of “after-burners”: the pumping of aviation fuel into the rear of the engine where it is ignited by the hot gases) which achieves the goal, but not only burns considerably more fuel but creates a great deal of noise.  Anyone who has ever attended an airshow where military jets are performing will understand!  The noise issue is further evident with the large, and defensible, amount of training the military pilots undertake.  Back in the 1980s low-flying jets, practicing evading enemy radar systems were a common feature of the more open space across the UK, and the source of many, many complaints for noise.  While that has reduced due to a reduced requirement to low fly and a decrease in overall military jet numbers, the increasing use of night-vision devices with the need to practice night low-flying has brought a different noise disturbance.  Furthermore, it is primarily in the helicopter and transport fleets that this increase has risen, with the inhabitants of those areas frequented by such aircraft subject to considerable night-time disturbance.  While all is done within reason to decrease the disturbance, and the military has a fair point in claiming that it must practice, much more could and should be done to reduce further the level of noise contamination.  Again, more investment in simulation would enable much more of this training to be undertaken synthetically; while live flying training will always be required, particularly in military aviation where the unexpected is more common than in the civilian sector, and while military simulators do not represent sufficient fidelity (due to under-investment), this problem is one that has a reasonable solution that should be pursued with greater vigour.

As an adjunct to this consideration of air power, man’s attempts to reach higher, above the atmosphere and into space, continue apace with ever more countries keen to have at least their own satellites, if not launch capability.  There is no near-term likelihood of an alternative to the massive hydro-carbon use for launch: as the military – and civilian – use of space continues, the environmental bill for overcoming earth’s gravity will continue to be significant: an interesting point for the future.

To conclude. Military aviation has a marked impact on the environment.  It is unlikely that ecological pressures alone will change the military mindset, although they can help to shape it.  There are some benefits accruing from changes in behaviour (albeit that the changes are driven by military necessity), and increased simulation in particular is having a beneficial effect.  Nevertheless, military aviation will continue to be environmentally unfriendly and efforts to reinforce good behaviour will have to continue.  But why should the military start to take its impact, particularly its use of hydro-carbons and the subsequent carbon output, seriously?  Ask any serious military man or woman about the experience of fighting, conflict, war (or whichever synonym you care to name) and they will emphatically state that they wish it could cease.  No sensible person who has experienced conflict would wish to repeat it, and all militaries wish to see a more secure world.  It is therefore ironic that carbon-generation, in which military aviation in particular excels, is clearly linked to climate change, and climate change itself threatens security and the global peace.  In seeking to deter or resolve conflict, it is possible that military aviators and aviatrix are inadvertently creating an even greater problem for the future than the ones they are presently seeking to resolve(2).

(1) As an aside and outwith the main thrust of this article, there are marked human security concerns about the increased use of unmanned vehicles that have yet to be fully explored (see, for example,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-colarusso/military-drones-and-the-e_b_278195.html

(2) The UK MoD’s own Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre has identified the security threat that climate change represents.  See the DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends Out To 2040 (and in particular pages 21 and 106):

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/38651ACB-D9A9-4494-98AA-1C86433BB673/0/gst4_update9_Feb10.pdf

About the author: Ian Shields is a retired, senior Air Force Officer and now a respected commentator on Defence and security matters, particularly with relation to Air and Space Power. He holds an MA from KCL, and MPhil from Cambridge and is presently undertaking a PhD in International Studies, also at Cambridge. He can be contacted via his web-site, www.ian-shields.co.uk

Image source: chanelcoco872

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